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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Subsequent to transfer from the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j), the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4).
RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court correctly determined that Defendant Alan

Gardner ("Gardner") owed Plaintiff Tasha Jensen ("Plaintiff) no duty of care
because the balcony upon which she hit her head was not a dangerous condition,
was open and obvious, and because Gardner had no reason to believe that the
balcony involved an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff.
2.

Alternatively whether Gardner owed no duty of care because Plaintiff

was a trespasser on the portion of the property where she was injured.
cc

An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate

grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party53 Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT App. 216,11 4, 239 P.3d 519.

1
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{

"Whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law . . . which we review for
correctness.35 Lopez v. United Automobile Ins. Go., 2009 UT App. 389, 11 8, 222
P3dll92.

1

Gardner preserved these issues for appeal by argument in support of his
Motion for Summary Judgment at Record (CCR") pp. 110-15.

i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,
1

This action arose in October 2008, when Plaintiff visited a four-plex Gardner
owned in order to consider renting an apartment. Plaintiff parked in a private
tenant parking lot without permission. When she left the building to return to the
car it was raining. She ran along the tenant driveway back to her car while looking
i

down at her feet. In doing so, she hit her head on an apartment balcony fell, and
sustained a broken leg.
B.
Course of Proceedings,
Plaintiff sued, seeking to impose premises liability on Gardner for her injury.
After conclusion of the discovery period Gardner moved for summary judgment on

^

the grounds that given the undisputed facts he owed Plaintiff no duty of care. The
district court granted Gardner's motion. Plaintiff now appeals that decision.
2
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|

C.

Restatement of Facts,
1.

In general terms, Plaintiffs Statement of Facts correcdy describes the

undisputed facts before the district court when it decided Gardner's motion.
Significandy however, in argument and an effort to analogize to favorable case
law, Plaintiff repeatedly characterizes the condition at issue as "an overhanging
balcony over a paved sidewalk." Aplt's. Br. p. 4 (emphasis added). See also id. pp.
9, 13 (cc. . . the overhang over the sidewalk. . . . The overhang was five (5) feet
two (2) inches above the sidewalk. . . . [DJirecdy over a paved sidewalk, leading
from an apartment where invitees live. . . . [A] prospective tenant would use the
sidewalk. . . . [Sjomeone using the sidewalk as an invitee, on a rainy day, might
cast her gaze downward and not see the overhanging balcony . . . .") (emphasis
added).
2.

Plaintiffs assertions in argument that: the subject balcony was located

so as to overhang a sidewalk or dedicated walkway are contrary to the undisputed
record evidence, and indeed Plaintiffs3 own Statement of Facts. Rather, the
undisputed fact with respect to balcony's location is as follows:
The balcony for one of the apartment units extends
approximately three feet seven inches; out from the
driveway side of the building, and is about five feet two

3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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inches off the ground and eleven feet long, framed with
three foot high white lattice on all three sides.
R. pp. 107-108, 129.1
i

"The complex has no sidewalk, walkway or path that
travels underneath the balcony upon which Tasha Jensen
hit her head.55
L±, p. 140.
3.

As a matter of undisputed fact, Plaintiffs accident occurred when she

determined "that she would run along the complex5 private driveway adjacent to
the building to get to her car.55 Aplt5s Br. p. 4 (emphasis added). She did this
while looking at the ground, and so struck the balcony located over the driveway:
Q.

[Mr. Anderson] Okay You say you had your head
down?

A.

[Tasha Jensen] Correct.

Q.

Because of the rain?

A.

Yes.

<

i

(

Plaintiffs Statement of Facts, as opposed to her argument, correctly states
that:

i
A balcony for one of the apartments extends approximately three feet
seven inches (3' 7") out from the driveway side of the building and is
about five feet two inches (51 2") off the ground.
I

5

Aplt s. Br. p. 4.
4
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Q.

How far in front of you do you remember being
able to see?

A.

Honestly I was just watching my feet.

Q.

Okay

A.

I had my head down and was just watching where
I was going down.

A.

I remember running, coming out of the apartment.
Like I said, it was sprinkling. I put my head
down, of course, and I was running and I
remember just hitting, smacking my head hard.

Q.

Okay.

A.

On this balcony. And it just totally took me back.

R. pp. 90-91.
4.

During the 30 years that Gardner had owned the four-plex:
No one other than Jensen has hit their head on the
balcony or been injured by it. Neither Kathy nor Alan
Gardner had any reason to know that: Jensen would walk
by the balcony Neither Alan nor Kathy Gardner
expected, or had reason to expect, that Jensen parked in
the apartment Complex5 parking lot, or that she would
run along the complex' private driveway adjacent to the
building to get to her car.

Aplfs. Br. p. 4 (citing R. p. 107).

5
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Gardner
because the undisputed facts established Gardner owed Plaintiff no duty of care.

i

The condition that caused Plaintiffs injury was not a dangerous condition, did not
involve an unreasonable risk of harm, was open and obvious and Gardner had no

(

reason to anticipate the harm suffered by the Plaintiff despite the obviousness of the
balcony Moreover, Gardner had no reason to expect that Plaintiff would fail to
discover the balcony or take reasonable care to protect herself against running into
it.
Alternatively, the district court's judgment should be upheld because Plaintiff
did not have express or implied permission to park in the private tenant lot and
i

traverse the tenant driveway. As a trespasser, Gardner owed her no duty of care.

i

i

i

6
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ARGUMENT
I.
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF WERE AN INVITEE, ALAN GARDNER OWED
HER NO DUTY BECAUSE THE BALCONY DID NOT CREATE AN
UNREASONABLE RISK OF HARM, BECAUSE THE GARDNER'S HAD
NO REASON TO EXPECT THE HARM TO PLAINTIFF OR
THAT SHE WOULD FAIL TO DISCOVER THE BALCONY AND
PROTECT HERSELF FROM IT, AND BECAUSE THE BALCONY WAS
OPEN AND OBVIOUS.
Sections 343 and 343A of the Second Restatement of Torts are read
together to define the duty of care that possessor's of land owe to invitees in Utah.
Hale v. Beckstead 2005 UT 24, 1f 8, 116 P.3d 263; Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 343 (1965) cmt. A.
Section 343, entitled "Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by
Possessor55 reads:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if,
but only if, he (a) knows or by the existence of
reasonable care would discover the condition, and should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover
or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves
against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to
protect them against the danger.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343 (1965); English v. Kienke, 848 E2d 153,
156 (Utah 1993).
Section 343A, entkled "Known or Obvious Dangers,55 provides in pertinent
part that:
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition
on the land who's danger is known or obvious to them,
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite
such knowledge or obviousness.
(Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A, (1965) (emphasis added); Hale, at 1f 9.

1

In her opening brief, Plaintiff gives virtually no consideration to Section
343A's impact on Alan Gardner's alleged duty of care despite its significance, except

<

to the extent it purportedly helps her under her unsupported version of the facts.
Even under Section 343 alone, however, the undisputed facts of this case show that

i

Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to show facts establishing that Alan Gardner
owed her a duty of care.
Foremost, Plaintiff developed no evidence that the balcony upon which she
hit her head involves "an unreasonable risk of harm" to invitees. An "unreasonable
risk of harm has been defined as a risk that a reasonably careful person under all
circumstances of the case would not allow to continue.55 Barrs v. RMBR Wheels,
<

8
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Inc.. 574 N.W2d 524, 528 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998). Plaintiff obtained no expert to
testify that the balcony involved an unreasonable risk of harm and cited to no
building code that the balcony violated. (R. 109, 112). Rather, the undisputed
evidence shows that leaving the balcony intact is reasonable. The facts developed at
the trial level are undisputed that the balcony has been present on the building for
more than thirty years and no one has ever hit their head on it or been injured by it
other than the Plaintiff. (R. 106, 109). Certainly a condition upon land that
existed without incident or injury for thirty years can not be considered
unreasonable. The trial court's grant of summary judgment can be upheld for this
reason alone.
Plaintiff also failed to develop any evidence that the Defendant's "should
have realized that [the balcony] involves an unreasonable risk of harm55 to invitees.
The undisputed evidence shows that invitees almost never park in the tenant
parking lot or use the Complex's driveway. (R. 107). Neither Alan nor Kathy
Gardner have ever given their permission to any invitee to drive and park there,
including the Plaintiff. (R. 107). Rather, the admitted evidence shows that the
driveway was clearly marked with no trespassing signs (R. 107). The evidence also
shows that neither Alan nor Kathy Gardner knew that the Plaintiff had parked in

9
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the private tenant parking lot or used the private tenant driveway (R. 107-109),
and that they had no reason to expect that Plaintiff, or any other invitee for that
matter, would be in the balcony's vicinity. (R. 107-109). Finally, Plaintiff has
failed to develop any evidence that Alan or Kathy Gardner should have expected
that the Plaintiff would fail to realize the existence of the balcony or protect herself
against running into it.
In her brief, Plaintiff relies primarily on the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 343 and Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, 221 P.3d 219, to argue that the
facts provide a basis for imposing a duty of care on Gardner. Aplt's. Br. pp. 8-13.
The argument fails, primarily because it relies on facts that are inconsistent with the
undisputed facts before the court.
Plaintiff argues the balcony she hit poses such an unreasonable risk because
cc

[t]he overhang was five (5) feet two (2) inches above the sidewalk." Aplfs. Br. p.

9 (emphasis added). But as a factual matter, Plaintiffs description is unsupported.
As set forth above, the balcony does not overhang a "sidewalk55 or walkway
at all. Rather, the undisputed facts show that it is located in a plainly visible
position on the side of a building over a private driveway, no one has ever hit their
head on it before and that neither Alan or Kathy Gardner had any reason to believe

10
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that Plaintiff or any other invitee would be in the balcony's vicinity (See Aplt's.
Br. p. 4, citing R. pp. 106-107).
For these reasons, Raab, which provides no analysis of the Restatement and
serves as Plaintiffs sole "evidence55 of an unreasonable risk, is wholly inapposite.
Raab involved an inconspicuous overhanging condition within an enclosed space
where employees were expected and intended to work. As the Court described the
facts:
During the process of checking the controls, [plaintiff]
entered the cab of one of the trailing locomotives, a 6000
series engine. This locomotive contained an after-market
air conditioning unit that was attached to the ceiling of
the locomotive cab. While the air conditioning unit did
not extend over the entire cab ceiling, it effectively
reduced the ceiling height to approximately 5 feet 10
inches in the area where it was attached. [Plaintiff], who
is 6 feet 4 inches tall in his work boots, stooped through
the 5 foot 6 inch cab door and safely entered the
locomotive. Once through the cab door, however, he
straightened up before he had completely passed under
the air conditioning unit, driving his head upward against
the air conditioner.
Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61,11 6, 221 E3d 219.
The undisputed facts make plain that there is no walkway extending beneath
the balcony and that invitees are not expected to be in the area. Thus Plaintiffs

11
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attempt to reshape the facts and use Raab to create liability is unpersuasive.

1

Moreover, Plaintiff incorrectly claims that the Raab Court "held that an overhead
air-conditioning unit... created an 'unnecessary danger of personal injury3 despite

<

being located 5 f ll n off the floor.55 Aplt5s Brief p. 9. Plaintiffs incorrect height
notwithstanding. Plaintiff is also wrong as to the court5s ruling. The Supreme

4

Court did not hold that the height of the unit created an unreasonable risk. Rather
the Supreme Court held that the lack of evidence on the subject "simply [did] not
speak to the determinative question of whether the location of the air-conditioning
unit created an unnecessary danger of personal injury55 as defined by the Federal
i

Locomotive Inspection Act, and remanded the matter to the trial court for
determination. Raab, 2009 UT 61 at 1f1f 52 and 57.
Raab simply does not support Plaintiffs argument here. The balcony over a
driveway posed no more unreasonable risk than any other object in the landscape
that Plaintiff may have encountered while running with her head down.
Plaintiff goes on to cite Section 343A and argue that Gardner might have
some duty "to warn or remediate a hazard[] even if it is copen and obvious.555

i

Aplfs Br. p. 12. Again, however, she relies upon facts that are not actually present
in this case:

cc

[A]n overhang five (5) feet two (2) inches off the ground, just lower
12
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i

than the average adult female, direcdy over a paved sidewalk, leading from an
apartment where invitees live, is a hazard which requires special notice or caution.55
I d p. 13.
Contrary to Plaintiffs argument, there is no balcony closely overhanging a
paved sidewalk leading from an apartment where tenants live involved in this case.
If there were, one might expect that persons traversing the sidewalk would
occasionally be distracted and hit the balcony as Plaintiff posits. Instead, however,
the balcony overhangs a private driveway and there is no evidence that anyone has
ever hit the balcony while driving or walking on the driveway Again, it is no
more likely to be struck by a distracted person than any other landscape feature.
According to the Utah Supreme Court:
To read negligence into every instance in which an
obvious danger is allowed to remain on one's own
property would impose upon private homeowners and
property owners a cumbersome burden, indeed, to ensure
that their homes and yards are perfectly clear from all
obvious and potentially injury-producing circumstances.
Regardless of which standard of care is most judicious to
impose upon possessors of land, however, the fact
remains that the law does not impose this burden.
Hale v. Bedstead, 2005 UT 24 at 11 29.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As the district court observed, the fact that Plaintiff chose to avoid the rain
while running with her head down is also significant to the duty analysis.
Although Utah appellate courts have not done so, in Richardson v. Vaughn, 622
N.E.2d 53 (111. App. Ct. 1993), the Illinois Court of Appeals addressed a case very
similar to the instant one, in which the plaintiff was injured after running for a
distance without watching where he was going. I d at 55. The Court noted:
Under the factual circumstances of the present case, we
are unable to conclude that plaintiff was generally
exercising reasonable care for his own safety. . . . [I]t
would be unreasonable to require defendants to anticipate
that plaintiff. . . would blind himself to the probable
consequences of his actions. . . . Although drawing the
line between mere inattention and reasonably foreseeable
distraction is not susceptible to mathematical precision
and requires a careful focus upon the particular facts at
hand, the failure to make this distinction would
impermissibly expand a defendant's scope of potential
liability to unforeseeable dimensions. Moreover,
imposing a duty on possessors of land that is premised on
a plaintiffs inattentiveness would place a burden on
possessors of land tantamount to requiring them to insure
the safety of their invitees. Defendants . . . are entitled to
the expectation that their patrons will exercise reasonable
care for their own safety.
I d at 57; accord Wittleman v. Olin Corp.. 832 N.E.2d 932, 935 (HI. App. Ct.
2005) (holding that, cc[i]n analyzing the foreseeability of a distraction, the

14
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exception only applies when the defendants can anticipate injury to invitees who are
generally exercising reasonable care for their own safety555).2
Even if it were possible to anticipate that rain could pose some distraction, it
is not possible to foresee that when confronted with rain, an individual might put
her head down and run, so risking an encounter with any object in the landscape.
Such behavior mitigates against finding a duty of care even under the New Jersey
case Plaintiff cites in her brief:
If. . . the [invitee] is aware of the dangerous condition
or by a reasonable use of [her] faculties would observe it,
the host is not liable because of the guest5s failure to use
due care.
Paries v. Rogers, 825 A.2d 1128, 1132 (NJ. 2003).

2

This "distraction theory55 has not even been preserved for appeal as it was
never analyzed by the Plaintiff before the trial court. (R. 127-137). Moreover, it
would nevertheless fail even if it had. Plaintiff testified that she never observed the
balcony in either of the first two times she passed it because she was busy talking to
Ms. Evans (see Addendum No. 1, pp. 8-9). The distraction theory does not apply
when there is nothing for the Plaintiff to forget: cc| p]laintiff testified that he did not
see or was otherwise aware of [the alleged dangerous condition] until the instant
immediately prior to [his injury]; therefore no duty could arise from defendant's
having to anticipate momentary forgetfulness because it would offend logic to
contend that one could be forgetful of a condition of which he had no prior
knowledge.55 Richardson, 622 N.E.2d at 57.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

i

Indeed, even if they expected her to pass the balcony the Gardners were entitled to
presume the Plaintiff would watch where she was going as a matter of law.
II.
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS A TRESPASSER ON THE PORTION OF
THE PROPERTY WHERE SHE WAS INJURED, GARDNER OWED
HERNODUTY.
Plaintiff labors to establish that she was a business invitee became she had at
least "implied permission'5 to be on Gardner's property Again, Plaintiffs argument
is inconsistent with the undisputed facts.
For example, Gardner does not dispute that the Plaintiff was a business
invitee as to the front portion of the Complex and the apartment unit that was
shown to her by Kathy Gardner. But that is not where Plaintiffs accident
occurred.
Utah law makes plain that cca person may be an invitee as to part of the
premises, and a mere . . . trespasser as to another part of the premises.35 Hayward
v. Downing, 189 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1948). A person becomes a trespasser
when they enter upon an unauthorized portion of another person's land "without a
privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise.55 Whipple v.
American Fork Irrigation Co.r 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996).
16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiffs argument ignores the undisputed facts that her accident occurred
along a private driveway posted with two clearly visible signs reading "Tenant
Parking Only" and ccNo Trespassing.55 As Plaintiff herself acknowledges:
Upon arriving at the complex, Jensen drove down the
complex's driveway and parked in the tenant parking lot
behind the building. The driveway leading back to the
tenant parking lot is private and has two clearly visible
signs stating "Tenant Parking Only55 and "No
Trespassing55. Neither Alan nor Dorothy Gardner gave
Jensen permission to use the private driveway or park in
the private tenant parking lot, and they did not know she
had parked there. Alan Gardner does not recall ever
telling a prospective tenant to park in the tenant parking
lot, and instead tells them to park elsewhere.
Aplt5s. Br. p. 3 (citing R. pp. 104-05 (sic) - the correct citations are actually R. pp.
106-107).
Under Utah law, "implied permission . . . may be inferred from [the
owner5s] knowingly allowing repeated use of his land without his objection.55
Stevens v. Salt Lalce County, 478 P2d 496, 498 (Utah 1970). As set forth above,
however, Plaintiff has wholly failed to develop facts to support an inference
Gardner knowingly allowed repeated use of the driveway by persons like the
Plaintiff.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On the contrary pursuant to the undisputed facts she was not a tenant and
was injured on a driveway portion of the property clearly marked with "Tenant
Only" and "No Trespassing" signs. "[T]he only duty a possessor of land owes to a
trespasser is to not willfully or wantonly injure him." Whipple, 910 P.2d at 1220;
accord Golding v. Ashley, 902 P.2d 142, 145-146 (Utah 1995). Moreover, a
possessor of land is not liable to trespassers for physical harm caused by the
possessor's failure to exercise reasonable care, "to put the land in a condition
reasonably safe for [trespasser's] reception." Whipple, 910 P.2d at 1220.
Because the facts are undisputed that the Plaintiff was a trespasser upon the
portion of the property where she hit her head, and there is no evidence or
allegation Gardner willfully caused injury to the plaintiff, Gardner owed Plaintiff no
duty with respect to the balcony as a matter of law. The district court's judgment
should also be affirmed on that basis.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Gardner respectfully requests this Court to
affirm the district court's order of summary judgment and dismissal of Plaintiffs
Complaint.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY - WEST JORDAN, STATE OF UTAH
TASHA LEE JENSEN,
) Deposition of:
) TASHA LEE JENSEN
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
) Case No. 080422569
) Judge Adkins
ALAN GARDNER, an individual; )
KATHY GARDNER, an individual, )
DOES 1-50,
)
)
Defendants.
)

1

)
Location: Bertch Robson
1996 East 6400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Reporter: Susie Lauchnor, CSR, RPR
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah
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APPEARANCES

1

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Kevin K. Robson, Esq.
BERTCH ROBSON
1996 Est 6400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
(801) 424-3800

1
j
|
1
1
J

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
Mark R. Anderson, Esq.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
(801) 521-5678
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Monday, June 15, 2009 * 9:36 a.m.
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DepomaxMerit
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1
2
3
TASHA LEE JENSEN,
4
5
called as a witness, being first duly sworn,
6
was examined and testified as follows:
7
8
EXAMINATION
9
10
BY MR. ANDERSON:
11
Q May I call you Tasha?
12
A Tasha.
13
Q Tasha?
14
A Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes, you may.
Q Okay. Tasha, would you state your name 15
16
for the record, full name for the record, please?
17
A Tasha Lee Jensen.
18
Q Okay. And we were chatting before. I
believe you said you've never had your deposition 19
20
taken before; is that correct?
21
A This will be the first time, yes.
Q Okay. Let me give you a couple of quick 22
ground rules. Basically you Ve just been sworn, so 23
24
this is sworn testimony just as if it were at trial.
25
It can be used at trial.
PROCEEDINGS

INDEX
TASHA LEE JENSEN:
Examination by Mr. Anderson

I
I
EXHIBITS
NO.
DESCRIPTION
PAGE
1 Photographs
15
2 Alta View Hospital Medical Records
64
3 Drawing
70
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A Okay.
Q When we take these depositions, we like the way we like to do it is let me finish my question.
You may get where I'm going with a question, but let
me finish it before you answer because it makes it
really hard on the court reporter to type two people
talking at the same time. And then I'm going to do
the same thing. I'm going to try not to interrupt
your answer and let you finish.
A Okay.
Q Also, you want to answer audibly as
opposed to nodding and things like that or shaking
your head.
And then I will ask some really confusing
questions from time to time, most likely, because I
tend to do that. So if you don't understand anything
that I ask, you're free to ask me to rephrase, to
explain what I meant. And make sure you understand
the question before you answer it because if you
answer the question, we'll assume that you understood
it. Okay?
A Okay.
Q Also, if you ever need a break, just say
you need a break. If I have asked a question, I
prefer that you answer it and then ask for a break,
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but you can take a break whenever you want. This
isn't a - we're not trying to test your endurance
here or anything like that. And I don't think this is
going to take a whole lot of time.
Basically I want to start off by having
you kind of describe for me the events that led up to
your injury. If you could start with ~ I believe you
were looking for an apartment. Kind of start from
there and go from there, if you don't mind.
A Okay. The date was October 16, 2006.
Q Okay.
A I was looking for an apartment to rent.
My friend, Rene Naso, came with me. And we had come
to the apartment and the manager's wife was there. We
went down to look at the apartment and she showed us
the apartment, told me that I had to pay a deposit
fee, like for the - 1 can't even think of the name of
it — the rental agreement if I wanted it. Because I
told her I had to leave, I was in a hurry, and I would
to be back because Rene's son had an appointment and I
was going to go with her.
Q Okay.
A So we told her we would come back. On our
way out Rene was in front of myself and it was
starting to sprinkle at the time outside. So I put my
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head down and I was running to the driveway to go baclJ
to my car and that is when I hit my head.
1
Q Okay. Let me back up a little bit. Who
1
did you initially talk to on the phone when you were
1
looking - when you were looking to go see the
1
apartment? Did you speak 1
A I spoke with her that day.
1
Q You spoke with Kathy?
1
A Yes, I did.
1
Q Do you remember which apartment you were 1
looking at?
1
A It was the basement right-hand corner
1
apartment. I don't know the number.
1
Q Okay. So if you're on the street 1
A Yes.
I
Q — facing - I believe if you're -- the
1
street goes north and south and you would be facing
1
west?
I
A The apartment actually faces east. It's
1
on a street like this, of course, running north and
1
south, like you said.
1
Q Okay.
I
A And the apartment complex faces east. So
1
it would have been the bottom right-hand basement.
|
Q Okay. So if you're facing west from the
j
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road, it's the bottom right-hand apartment?
A Yes, basement. Correct.
Q Okay. And how long approximately were you
in the apartment looking at it?
A Approximately — I can't grv& you a set
time. I would say maybe possibly 10 minutes at the
most. We were just in, looked around and then she
told me, you know, If you cannot fill this out, you
have to pay a fee and then bring it back. And I
didn't do that.
Q Okay.
A And we left.
Q Okay. Do you recall if -- you said it was
sprinkling when you left?
A Yes, it was sprinkling.
Q Okay. Actually, let's back up a little
bit. When you got to the apartment building, where
did you park? I'm assuming you were driving.
A Yes, I drove.
Q Okay.
A She was a passenger. You pull in the
apartment complex and you go down a driveway and I
parked in the back.
Q Okay. And then did you — when you were
coming from your car, j j ^ o ^
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driveway the way you came?
I
A You mean walking?
1
Q Yeah.
1
A Or when I left driving?
I
Q Okay. So you pull in the driveway?
I
A Correct.
1
Q You go park?
1
A Uh-huh (affirmative).
I
Q And then when you went to the apartment
1
buildi ng to look at it, did you come back up through
I
the driveway?
1
A Yeah, I came the same way as I drove in.
1
That was the only way that I knew that you could have. I
Q Okay. If you ~ did you speak with anyone
1
on the phone about whether or not you were supposed toi
be driving ~ supposed to be parking in the driveway
1
or anything like that? Do you recall anything about
1
that?
1
A I don't recall Kathy saying anything about
I
that.
1
Q Okay.
1
A But, I mean, obviously I knew you had to
I
go back that way because that was the only way
I
possibly that I seen you could go in.
1
Q Okay. Did you happen to - the balcony
1
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that you ultimately hit your head on, did you see that
when you were either driving in to park or when you
were walking back?
A I did not see that.
Q You didn't see it?

A

I did not.

Q Was it raining or anything like that at
the time?
A When we got there, no, it was not raining.
As we left, yes, it started to sprinkle.
Q Well, what were you doing as you were
walking past it the first time? Actually, no.
What were you doing? Were you speaking
with your friends or anything as you were driving?
A We were just talking, yes.
Q And on the way as you were walking past it
the first time to go to the apartment —
A Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q
were you talking to her or anything
like that?
A Just probably brief, you know, talking
back and forth, yes.
Q Okay. So you go in and you look at the
apartment?
A Yes.
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Q And then you said Rene needed to leave and
1
so you I
A Rene needed to leave, correct.
1
Q Okay. Do you recall any pathways or
1
anything that you were following as you came out of
1
the apartment and were heading back to your car? Were 1
you following a pathway? What were you doing exactly?!
A To my memory, I remember just this little
1
sidewalk up front when I come out of the apartment and 1
it's — of course, I had my head down and then I
1
turned the corner. She was in front of me ~
1
Q Okay.
1
A — when we had left the apartment.
1
Q How far in front of you was - it's Rene?
1
A Rene.
1
Q Rene?
1
A Yeah.
1
Q How far in front of you was she?
I
A In the distance. I'm not sure. Like I
1
said, my head was down. I wasn't really looking her
1
direction. Maybe a few feet possibly.
1
Q Okay. Did Kathy stay in the apartment
1
when you left?
J
A Yes, she was still in the apartment. She
1
was cleaning, actually, that apartment - another
J
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apartment for someone to live on site.
Q Okay.
A A. manager to live on site. So yes, she
was there.
Q All right.
A Not cleaning my apartment, but cleaning
another one so someone could come and live on site.
So she showed us the apartment, correct. So she was
still in there when we left.
Q So when you left the apartment that you
looked at A Yes.
Q — the one on the — let's just say the
lower right-hand side. Let's call it the lower
right-hand apartment.
A Yes.
Q When you left the lower right-hand
apartment, she stayed in it to continue to clean?
A Yes, she was in that apartment. Me not
knowing when she came out. After I hit my head
everything was pretty much a ~
Q Okay. I'm just trying to get kind of a—
just get the story of how this all ~
A I understand. That's okay.
Q And then did you stay on the path, the
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sidewalk? I mean, is it a sidewalk or a pathway?
1
It's paved, correct?
1
A Yes. When I came out of the apartment,
1
yes, I was running on a sidewalk.
1
Q Okay. You say you had your head down?
1
A Correct.
|
Q Because of the rain?
I
A Yes.
§
Q How far in front of you do you remember
1
being able to see?
j
A Honestly, I was just watching my feet.
1
Q Okay.
1
A I just had my head down and just was
I
watching where I was going down.
1
Q So you were just looking at the path below
I
you to make sure you were staying on the pathway?
1
A Yes.
1
Q Okay. Now, you said that Rene, is that
1
the co rrect —
1
A Yes.
I
Q Was running ahead of you and then what do I
you recall after that? Tell me what you recall.
1
A I remember running, coming out of the
J
apartment. Like I said, it was sprinkling. I put my
1
head down, of course, and I was running and I remembe j
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